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THE MFENGU REVISlTED: 
THE 19th CENTURY EXPERIENCE OF ONE MFENGU COMMUNITY 
THROUGH THE EYES OF HISTORIANS AND CONTEMPORARIES 
This is not the paper I originally set out to write, which was intended to deal with one or two 
quite specific matters in the story of the Mfengu community living in two adjacent rural 
locations named Oxkraal and Kamastone near the village of Whittlesea in the Queenstown 
district of the eastern Cape Colony. Instead, I have decided to set down some of that history 
against the background of present debate and of a persistent orthodoxy which has influenced 
historical writing. 
In most writing about African agriculture in the eastern Cape Colony during the second half 
of the nineteenth century, the Mfengu are celebrated as examplars of keen and proficient 
cultivators.[l] I do not intend to challenge this view more than indirectly today, for there is 
undoubtedly much in favour of it; instead, I want to draw attention to certain factors which 
support that way of thinking about the Mfengu to the point of over-legitimizing it, allowing a 
measure of contemporary myth to gain respectability as reality in historians' texts and in one 
of the most popularly-read books offering panaceas for modem South Africa's ills. There, 
"The Mfengu- natural entrepreneurs", is the introduction to a few pages which survey the 
decline of African agriculture. But the book as a whole tends not to acknowledge fully the 
major structural difficulties which South African capitalist development placed in the way of 
rural Africans' freedom of decision and action, or which forced a large proportion of Africans 
to participate in the market to the detriment of their own adequate subsistence.[2] 
Clarity in these matters will have to be found without much help from oral evidence. 
Attempting to collect oral evidence about the Queenstown Mfengu earlier this year, I was 
foiled not only by the wish of the Ciskei authorities to let me speak only to members of the 
"Tribal Authorities" nurtured by the semi-autonomous administration, but also by a factor far 
more significant in the long term: a genuine and considerable lack of knowledge even on the 
part of elderly but lucid and quite well-educated people. "Ah yes", they would say, "Better 
to ask us about the time after 1920". The obvious significance here, and challenge, is that 
what historians write about earlier days may heavily influence the recovery of community 
self-perception as literacy spreads. This is hardly a novel point, but it is plainly going to 
matter for the future - and sooner rather than later. 
The range of studies now available on Ciskeian and Transkeian African societies and 
economies between c. 1850 and 1900 is now good enough to show that there is no clear-cut 
and universally applicable connection between the degree of colonially-induced 
transformation experienced by an indigenous community and its response to survival needs. 
For example, impoverishment in Pondoland did not necessarily induce an immediate increase 
in labour migrancy, and the relatively wealthy Engcobo district in Emigrant Thembuland 
sent out far more migrants than certain adjacent but poorer districts.[3] Thus, within the 
general process of African rural impoverishment which has afflicted South Africa over a long 
period, there have been specific and local variations, evident not least during the formative 
nineteenth century which was for the most part pre-industrial. There is no good reason why 
these variations should not apply to the Mfengu too -just as, for that matter, there is a good 
case for refusing to specify a specific decade when the whole of South African white 
agriculture became capitalist.[4] 
And so I want to suggest that the origins of the acclaimed Mfengu agricultural production 
also show regional variations, and that historians need to wear the spectacles of scepticism 
when dealing with the eulogies of white officials who "supervisedyy the Mfengu. What 
follows is based mainly on my researches into the Queenstown Mfengu, but the paper owes 
considerable debts to Moyer, Bundy and Lewis as well. 
Bundy based much of his argument in The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry on 
the belief that between roughly the 1870s and the last years of the nineteenth century, 
Africans in the Eastern Cape responded to opportunities created by the advent of a money- 
based market for their produce, a market whose existence reflected the intrusion of the 
aggressive capitalist colonial economy and alien patterns of administration into African m a l  
areas. Lewis criticized this interpretation on the ground that nearly all the produce sold by 
Africans was not a true surplus above subsistence requirements, but rather the unavoidable 
sale of produce essential for adequate nutrition. The experience of the Queenstown Mfengu 
supports this dimension of Lewis's argument, and provides the subject of the first detailed 
study to venture onto this disputed ground since Lewis wrote.[5] Nonetheless, the origins of 
NLfengu production were not universally quite as Lewis suggests. 
Lewis sees the cataclysmic Xhosa cattle-killing and crop destruction of 1856-57 as vital to 
the incorporation of the Xhosa into the money-based colonial economy: deprived of a 
subsistence base, they had no choice but to labour in the colony and to accept the imposition 
of colonial administrators and of taxes which could only be paid in cash. The Mfengu, Lewis 
argues, were moving in this direction even before the cattle-killing. As colonial 
collaborators, they were rewarded after the 1850-53 frontier war with tracts of land (Oxkraal 
and Karnastone, Keiskammahoek, Fort Beaufort etc.) on which crop production was feasible, 
especially when lungsickness (bovine pleuro-pneumonia) decimated their cattle herds 
between 1853 and 1855. Governor Sir George Grey was just as much a threat as 
lungsickness, for he proposed to subdivide the several Mfengu locations into small household 
plots under individual tenure and thereby to interfere with the homestead economy. 
Responding to these dual threats, some Mfengu acquired wagons, ploughs and (where 
possible) oxen to draw both, in an effort at diversification to preserve control over their local 
political economy. When the Xhosa experienced their great need, the Mfengu were in a 
position to supply them with substantial quantities of grain, and did so via purchasing depots 
set up by the colonial authorities. Large amounts of cash entered the Mfengu locations 
thereby, stimulating continued crop sales in future years as a way of raising money for tax 
payments and the acquisition of consumer articles - a process going on throughout the 
Eastern Cape.[6] 
Lewis's picture of the origins of Mfengu agricultural production rests on information about 
the Keiskammahoek and Peddie Mfengu. While it may be valid in those cases, it does not 
readily fit the experience of the Queenstown Mfengu. Even on some of their new land, 
Mfengu were regarded as short-term tenants only and were overcrowded from the outset - so 
much so, that at Fort Beaufort they broke up grazing land for crops in an effort to meet their 
1 subsistence requirements.[7] Substantial numbers of Peddie and Tyhume Mfengu entered service with farmers during 1854 and 1855,[8] and it seems plain enough that there was a 
subsistence crisis in these locations. But the Queenstown Mfengu were not so crowded, 
despite a major influx of population, and did not engage in similar labours. Queenstown 
farmers were starved of labour at this time, and Mfengu did not work for them save in 
isolated cases. Let us review some of the issues involved. 
In the first place, we do not know with certainty who the people known as "Mfengu" were. 
What was generally-accepted orthodoxy until recently - that the Mfengu were people forced 
southward from Natal by the Mfecane - is being questioned in a fascinating but yet unproven 
hypothesis which postulates that far from having been brought out by the British in 1835 
from a sort of undefied oppressive subordination amongst the Xhosa, they were nearly all 
Xhosa who were captured by British and colonial forces in the 1835 frontier war, and carted 
off to the colony as a labour force. A minority amongst them was treated more decently and 
allowed to settle in dispersed mission settlements. [g] It has been recognized for some time 
that the term "Mfengu" has a catch-all nature, and that a Mfengu could be a Gcaleka or 
Thembu (for example) who sought accommodation amongst what was accepted as a Mfengu 
community. But now Cobbing and Webster are suggesting that the Mfengu were not a 
roughly homogenous ethnic entity by origin. This theory of Mfengu origins appeals to me 
with regard to the Queenstown community, whose post-1853 nucleus was assembled in the 
late 1840s from a thoroughly disparate trickle of "Mfenguyy (?) who converged on the 
Kamastone mission station from as far afield as the Tzitzikamma. The community which 
survived the next war (1850-53) entered peacetime as one whose political and economic 
institutions were in flux, and its members certainly did not all owe allegiance to any one 
leader, whether styled a chief or headman by the colonial authorities or not. 
In 1853, land near to Kamastone mission was annexed to the Cape Colony to form the 
Queenstown district, and white farmers settled on extensive tracts adjoining the Mfengu 
lands. The authorities shuttled the Mfengu around so drastically during 1854, before leaving 
them more or less in peace under a white Superintendent on what became the Oxkraal and 
Kamastone rural locations, that a couple of years were needed for social and economic 
"shakedown". Obviously a key priority after such serious unsettlement was the production of 
food, and the volume of food production would have risen rapidly between 1853 and the 
onset of the cattle-killing because of an enormous influx of outsiders, by no means all what 
passed by then as ethnic Mfengu, into the locations during that time. The statistics are 
wretchedly unreliable; nevertheless, the population probably rose by over 2,000 in two 
years. And long after the cattle-killing, outsiders who were primarily Thembu persisted in 
trying to gain access to the locations, often encouraged by local headmen who wanted to 
build up followings, but sometimes prevented by the location Superintendents. These were 
not conditions under which the Mfengu of Queenstown would supply grain to destitutes in 
Xhosaland: they were too busy trying to feed themselves, and the newcomers were 
establishing their own homesteads. The distance from their locations to the purchasing 
depots was also greater than Mfengu from more easterly locations would have needed to go. 
And one cannot invoke the E l  quitrent charge as effective proof that there were a lot of sales 
of produce to raise cash, for the Mfengu were frequently offered exchange in kind at the 
trading stores. This tendency only changed gradually: monetization was more common at 
the end of the 1860s than at the beginning of the decade. The Superintendent of the 
Queenstown Mfengu defended the people against charges of defaulting on hut tax on the 
grounds that the exchange system made it difficult for them to pay.[lO] This contrasts 
vividly with the cash-flush Mfengu Lewis claims lived in Keiskammahoek; moreover, it was. 
not until 1863 that the Queenstown Mfengu started to sell produce in noteworthy quantities 
to traders in their vicinity. 
So the "fresh lands plus opportunity to make money from starving Xhosa plus hut 
tax/quitrent demands" thesis about the origins of Mfengu agricultural production will not 
really fit the Queenstown case. The Queenstown Mfengu certainly did develop a great need 
for cash income to pay taxation and to purchase manufactures, but this occurred once their 
administration was tightened-up from the 1860s and under the impact of the appalling 
drought of the first half of the 1860s, plus worsening stratification amongst homesteads, with 
polygamous homesteads generally the better off - not under the stimulus of a cash bonanza 
from sales to the Xhosa. What, then, of Lewis's other major thesis, that most market 
production by Africans was not a true surplus over and above subsistence requirements? 
Here we are on firmer ground, but must beware of exaggerating the extent of damage to the 
homestead economy before the imposition of individual tenure in 1877, in the Queenstown 
case at least. Lewis made the mistake of analysing mid- 1860s Oxkraal and Karnastone as 
surveyed locations.[l l] In fact, petitions against survey submitted in 1873 by four territorial 
groups within the locations indicate that elements of a pre-colonial productive mode still 
obtained. Here is an example: 
... grant to us the piece of land as originally given by our first 
Magistrate ... to Mayekiso and Vumam and their people. 
We have long ploughed and sowed. We have built houses and 
kraals [homesteads], and have lived in peace, but we should like 
some letter from the Government that the ground is our own, 
and that our present arrangements will not be interfered with.[l2] 
Yet this communal-sounding mode of production and social organization, whose specific 
characteristics are impossible to reconstruct, had failed to enable the people to resist major 
colonially-driven damage to their economic wellbeing. Economic stratification of an intense 
type had emerged, due to a range of factors. Many homesteads were unable to rise above the 
poverty with which they entered the 1850s, and were weighed down with quitrentbut tax 
demands, while the minority of polygamous homesteads benefited from commanding a 
numerous labour force to work in the fields and to mind stock. In these larger homesteads 
one finds most of the market-focused dynamic of surplus production which Bundy 
emphasizes, for it was these which had most chance of generating a true surplus over their 
own requirements, or of running enough sheep to make money from wool sales. In 1869, 
when a land surveyor carried out preliminary work on the external boundaries of the location, 
a wealthy headman named Goda put a plan to him by which the locations would be divided 
into a few farms of 2-4,000 morgen (4.5-9 thousand acres), granted in undivided shares to 
groups of twelve to twenty people (the size of an average homestead), "mostly of one kin or 
affinity". Goda warited this because "it would enable the most industrious in time to become 
sole owners of a part or the whole by buying out their partners ... and to 'become 
Englishmen'".[l3] 
Plainly this reveals incipient self-conscious class formation and a blatantly elitist concept of 
the future. Exploiting the labour of clan segrnents,'Goda intended to use the binding force of 
nearer kindred to serve his interests. The community emphasis in the 1873 petitions had no 
place here. David Parkin has shown how Giriama accumulators in Kenya have manipulated 
bridewealth and other traditional mechanisms of wealth distribution to their own 
advantage[l4]; likewise, Goda and his like wanted to use survey as a weapon to end all 
traditional means of redistribution in their society which had suffered severe colonially- 
inflicted damage. 
The extent of that damage has been examined by Lewis, and more recently by me, on the 
basis of computer analysis of contemporary reports, letters and unpublished census data.[l5] 
I had access to more census data than Lewis did. It is too long and technical an exercise to 
put down here. The findings agree that severe economic stratification existed as early as 
c.1860, and almost certainly before that. However, there is disagreement over the timing of 
the period of the most extensive production, and in fact there is a three-way disagreement 
here, for Lewis and I disagree with Bundy over the periodization too. 
In the new Preface to the second edition of his book, whose main text is unaltered, Bundy 
does not concede Lewis's argument that the high point of production had been passed by the 
mid 1870s, insisting that it had not been attained by then. I think there are two reasons for 
the difference in views, particularly as far as the Mfengu are concerned: first, the need to 
reach agreement over the degree of reliability of the unpublished census data for individual 
locations, and second, the historian's vulnerability to exaggerated contemporary reports, 
some of which have fostered the myth of the efficient and wealthy Mfengu. 
An exaggerated impression of Mfengu wealth prevailed from the early 1850s amongst 
colonial officials and public, nearly all of whom were impervious to pleas to the contrary. In 
1865 the Queenstown newspaper claimed that "many" Mfengu held bank accounts, but in the 
comparative context of a small community like white Queenstown this could have been as 
few as twenty or thirty.[l6] In 1869, changing its tune and noting that very few Mfengu had 
bank accounts (this itself discloses flawed colonial perceptions and information), the 
newspaper commented, 
They do earn a great deal more money than they spend in food 
and clothing. We suspect however that most of them prefer 
investing in live stock.[l7] 
Mythologies clouded the editor's thinking as he wrote of Mfengu super-industriousness and 
of a cult status applied to livestock. There was no perception that wealth in the locations was 
massively unevenly distributed. Similarly, when John Hemming returned to Queenstown as 
Civil Commissioner in 1875 after an absence of several years, he reported a "very great 
advancementyy amongst the Mfengu. There were more brick or stone dwellings, more 
irrigation furrows, and "the slopes of the hills and extent of land turned over surprised me 
...".[ 181 He did not know that there were only ninety brick houses amongst more than two 
thousand dwellings,[l9] and in 1878 asserted that, 
In 1865 the ... Locations were thinned by the emigration of about 
1200 people, those remaining behind occupying the ground thus 
vacated in addition to what they were then in possession of. 
They have increased in wealth since that time ... [20] 
On the contrary, after some of the community emigrated to what is now the southern 
Transkei in 1865, much of the evacuated land probably passed into the hands of headmen and 
a small group which had been accumulating stock and land before 1865. Stratification 
became more, not less, intense after 1865, and if there was a rise in production, it was not 
exclusively, and probably not even largely, the effort of the smaller homesteads. The 
Queenstown evidence does not conform to Lewis's assertion that agricultural production by 
poorer homesteads inc~ased  across the board in the Mfengu locations between 1865 and 
1875.[21] I have also been unable to accept the way Bundy interpreted Hemming's remarks, 
which was as evidence of a still-rising surplus production;[22] actually, statistical and 
detailed documentary analysis suggest that agricultural enterprise was already in serious 
trouble. The 1891 census, a poor source but still better than the 1875 census, suggests that 
even if they had been able to retain all their production for their own consumption, the 
Mfengu would have had a grain supply of 571 lbs. per person per year, over 100 lbs. below 
the minimum adequate nutritional level of 689 lbs. which was specified by a study in 
1952.[23] Since they actually sold some of their produce, the intensive cultivation which 
delighted Hemming was woefully less than what was necessary. 
Yet the myth of the rich Mfengu remained powerful. In 1868, the Queenstown Mfengu 
asked for unrestricted access to a pocket of Crown land next to their locations in order to 
graze cattle. The response by an official whose knowledge of the area was unquestionably 
better than that of most of his fellows was also conditioned by a largely unsubstantiated 
impression of Mfengu wealth: 
Why should they have a free run? ... they can club together and 
purchase the lease ... as a body they can afford to give a higher 
price for the land than the European farmer.[24] 
The fixed belief of local officials and the Native Affairs Secretariat in Cape Town that the 
Mfengu were wealthy helps to account for the exclusion of adjacent Crown land from the 
area divided into individual plots in 1877. Greatly mistaken though the authorities were, they 
were probably encouraged by the example of a mere handful of Mfengu who did lease 
additional ground. 
Jacob Mkande, an intriguing figure about whom all too little is known, accumulated stock 
while living on a mission, and bought two small but good farms near Oxkraal, originally 
owned by whites, during the 1870s. In the early 1880s, three other Mfengu leased farms in 
the same area, paying annual cash rentals of up to £230. These were highly exceptional. All 
such enterprising people were also hampered by all Africans' lack of access to financial 
credit. Had Africans in the rural locations been able to borrow money, they would have been 
able to buy and develop land. Development was no less vital, over time, than purchase and 
initial access: without developing the productive resources of the land, one could easily bse 
it, as many poor whites found out. Throughout the Eastern Cape, institutional lenders were 
reluctant to provide money even to rural whites. It was asking a great deal to expect a lender 
to believe that an African with few means beyond his livestock could establish himself on 
some quitrent land, pay his quitrent each year, and repay his loan. Furthermore, Queenstown 
Wengu had to compete with a rapidly capitalizing class of white farmers who wanted to 
augment their landholdings. 
A land survey, designed to divide Oxkraal and Kamastone into small plots, was finally 
launched in 1875 despite extensive opposition. Plots of six acres were measured for each 
householder, threatening the homestead structure of production and resource sharing which 
the petitioners of 1873 sought to preserve. Dispersed homesteads were to be concentrated 
into villages some distance from the lands. Work was in progress when an extraordinary 
letter from the Queenstown Civil Commissioner arrived on the Surveyor-General's desk in 
Cape Town, admitting that the Commission which had investigated the feasibility of survey 
had "failed to take evidence ... that the natives were d i n g  and anxious to obtain title to the 6 
acre allotments, this they most certainly are9'.[25] With reason, the Surveyor-General treated 
this sceptically; but he allowed the survey to proceed in the hope that it would reveal what 
the Mfengu actually thought. 
By so doing, the Surveyor-General committed the Mfengu to the burden of individual tenure. 
Although they protested, and the work of survey was continually interrupted by their 
representations, a survey was virtually unstoppable once underway. At that juncture in Cape 
history, in any case, encouraging individual tenure was a key element in an official obsession 
with undermining all foundations of chiefly authority. 
The survey favoured no-one save chief Zulu and several headmen, whose goodwill had to be 
bought with extra grants of land as compensation for lost powers. Goda and his cronies were 
completely outflanked and gained nothing, which suggests both that they lacked the effective 
patronage received by Zulu and his senior headmen, and that the government was 
unsympathetic to moving very large numbers of people out of the locations. For the mass of 
common people, the survey forced them to make the most of difficult circumstances. In this, 
they were greatly disadvantaged by a run of adverse seasons. By the end of 1879, with the 
survey only in operation for some eighteen months, water had almost run out and a 
substantial number of people had emigrated permanently. By 1883 the prospects were worse 
than the Locations Superintendent could recollect seeing over a period of twenty-five 
years. [26] 
Adding to the crisis was a lack of overflow grazing ground, exacerbated by loss of access to 
adjacent Crown land. Under all these circumstances, titles were taken up slowly or not at all. 
By the end of 188 1, only 153 of 1,779 grantees had collected and paid for their titles. 
Emigration continued throughout the 1880s. By 1887, well over 100 title-holding grantees 
were in m a r  with their quitrent payrnents.[27] 
In 1922, the Oxkraal and Kamastone survey was cited in an official report as an example of 
the inadequacy and unviability of many small-plot surveys of Cape rural locations carried out 
during the nineteenth century. Inheritance disputes wrought havoc with the title system, and 
the people evaded the village system in order to settle closer to their arable lands.[28] The 
details of the breakdown, and a close examination of to what extent the homestead economy 
did survive the shock of survey, await research; but historians will be quick to point out that 
the "Israelite" millennialists shot down at Bulhoek in 1921 lived in the Kamastone location. 
* * * 
Finally, as an issue without direct thematic links to the previous part of this paper, I would 
like to consider the matter of ethnicity amongst the Mfengu before c 1890. Although the 
period was highly significant in setting the foundations for the economic tragedy of the rural 
Cape African reserves, it seems not to have witnessed any significant development of an 
ethnic consciousness amongst the Mfengu beyond the well-known point that they had a 
history of collaboration with the colonial power during frontier conflicts, and that they 
constituted a group of people who gained access to increasingly scarce land as the fruit of 
their collaboration. Amongst the Queenstown Mfengu, however, there was no "consciously 
crafted ideological creation"; no "culture brokers" or educated intellectual core existed to 
speak to the people.[29] If any powerful and formative ideology was at work, it lay in the 
colonial authorities' muddled perception of distinct Mfengu "tribes", which is perpetuated in 
history books and popular white belief in the "tribal", "warring" or "fractious" character of 
African society.[30] Moyer does point out that settlement in the colony under a sort of 
British patronage encouraged the Mfengu to develop into a "cohesive political 
community9'.[31] Beyond this point, however, there was no sign of the kind of protest which 
animated Nehemiah Tile and the "Thembu Church" in the early 1880s. The Thembu were 
reacting to encroachment by white authority, obviously an inappropriate stance by the 
colonial Mfengu. But once the Thembu church ceased to be ethnic, and appealed instead to 
common blackness, Transkeian Mfengu joined it in the 1890s. E321 
The way historians understand Mfengu ethnicity is likely to be strongly influenced by 
whatever emerges from the current work on Mfengu origins. If the Mfengu actually were not 
Natal refugees, but (for the most part) a miscel%any of captives from the Transkei and Ciskei, 
then people like John Ayliff in 1835, Whiteside the amateur historian, and all officials 
connected with Mfengu administration subsequently, will appear as "culture brokers" who 
encouraged the emergence and consolidation of a Mfengu ethnicity. It is also worth noting 
that the untidy way in which the Mfengu c m  group assembled at Oxkraal and Kamastone 
between c. 1845 and 1852 meant that the followers of different headmen could interpret or 
express their assorted historical experiences in a way which their white Superintendents 
readily construed as "tribal". Denied opportunity of interaction with fresh sources of ideas, 
an ethnic history of the Mfengu took shape amongst the people themselves as well as 
amongst observers. And it all grew out of the colonially-generated justificatory dogma of 
"Mfengu liberation from Xhosa domination" by the British in 1835, which is now being 
challenged through effective research. 
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